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Abstract 
 
Nordic historians have asserted for a long time that in the Nordic countries only few peo-
ple, if any, perceived increased threats of war prior to the World War II outbreak. This 
would explain, and possibly excuse, why their governments did not mobilize their armies 
until it was too late. This paper questions this established notion by deriving new estimates 
of widely held war threat assessments from the fluctuations of sovereign market yields 
collected from all Nordic bond markets at this period. Our results show that the Nordic 
contemporaries indeed perceived significant war risk increases around the time of major 
war-related geopolitical events. While these findings hence question some, but not all, of 
the standard Nordic World War II historiography, they also demonstrate the value of ana-
lyzing historical market prices to reassess the often tacit views and opinions of large 
groups of people in the past. 
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1 Introduction 
In the conventional historical writing on World War II in the Nordic countries, historians 
have traditionally asserted that there were few, if any, Nordic people and, more impor-
tantly, political and military decision-makers who in 1939 and early 1940 recognized an 
increased threat of war to their own region. This historical finding is of significant impor-
tance as it helps to explain, and possibly also excuse, why the Nordic governments were so 
blatantly passive in mobilizing their armed forces on a large scale in the late 1930s and, 
consequently, largely unable to resist the attacks from the south and the east that came 
only a few months after the German invasion of Poland.1  
 
But can we fully trust historians in their descriptions of people’s pre-war threat assess-
ments? After all, historians primarily rely on careful in-depth analyses of recorded source 
materials even though public opinions and threat assessments are never written down and 
kept for future generations. Furthermore, historians are influenced by people and senti-
ments in their own political and social context and if historians incorporate what they feel 
their readers wish to read into historical accounts this may produce biased results.2 In other 
words, despite the great value that can be afforded to historical analyses there may be rea-
son to question some of their evaluations of peoples’ past assessments.  
 
There are, however, other ways to find out how people were able to recognize pending war 
threats. This paper uses a method which links significant changes in government bond 
yields, which were quoted around the time of the outbreak of the war, to major geopoliti-
cal pre-war events.3 The underlying idea is that wars put extraordinary pressures on coun-
tries’ fiscal balances and may, in the worst case, provoke sovereign repudiations or de-
faults. This, in turn, increases the sovereign risk of these bonds impying that they are ex-
                                                 
1 There is some variation to this picture, such as Finland mobilizing more than the others up to October 1939 
but then actually demobilized during November (i.e., the weeks before the Soviet attack) and isolated intelli-
gence reports on foreign troop movements reaching the Danish and Norwegian governments soon before the 
German invasion in April 1940. These issues are further discussed in section 2. 
2 Historians are themselves well aware of this problem. For example, Carr (1961) emphasized the interfer-
ence of historian with the historical writing behind the historical writing has been well understood. There are 
many examples of the biased historical writing resulting from winners writing the history of wars. Bryld 
(2003, pp. 14–29), e.g., argues that the official Danish postwar account of the country’s resistance movement 
during the war is a highly patriotic product in which historians have given in to contemporary pressures for a 
history of legitimization and national unification. 
3 The overlap between, on one hand, the general public and political and military decision makers and, on 
the other, the bond traders and investors is admittedly far from perfect. Still both the public and the market 
actors acted to a significant extent on publicly available information. Hence, one should expect their views 
and expectations about the future to be roughly identical. As for the political and military leaders, however, 
they partly possessed non-public information from the secret services, and to the extent that their views dif-
fered from those of the public this will be discussed .  
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pected to trade at lower prices and therefore higher yields on secondary markets.4 In other 
words, significant changes in sovereign market yields reflect changes in people’s pre-war 
threat assessments in real time.  
 
This paper provides new evaluations of the popular pre-war threat assessments prevailing 
in the Nordic countries during the outbreak of World War II.5 We use newly assembled 
sovereign yield data from the financial markets in Copenhagen, Oslo, Helsinki and Stock-
holm quoted during 1938–1940. From these yields, we then estimate unknown structural 
breaks6 in the form of significant mean-shifts, using the method of Bai and Perron (1998, 
2003). These breaks are selected endogenously from the time series properties of the 
yields, and can therefore be interpreted as the contemporaneously updated risk assess-
ments of the  actors in these historical financial markets. If they, furthermore, coincided 
with important pre-war political or military event this strongly suggests that the sovereign 
yield changes were in fact driven by changes in the widely perceived war threat.  
 
The second part of our analysis contrasts these market-based estimates with the corre-
sponding evaluations of Nordic historians. We do this by first considering a large number 
of writings by well-known and reputed Nordic World War II historians, from which we 
derive a fair, but of course not perfect, representation of the “conventional” historical 
view. Then we classify the resulting perceived threat levels, for each Nordic country, dur-
ing different time periods and, finally, contrast these threat levels with the findings of our 
own empirical analysis. While being far from complete, the comparison of these two ver-
sions of history sheds light on two important questions. First, is the conventional historiog-
raphy robust to an alternative assessment of the same historical phenomena? Second, if 
differences arise, are they consistent with the postwar historical war accounts, according to 
which the political leaders during the war could not have been expected to have more in-
formation since nobody is able to predict the impending events in the future?  
                                                 
4 Naturally, this also requires minor changes in other standard bond yield determinants, such as the coupon 
rate, the time to maturity, tax status of cash flows, redemption clauses and the discount rate. Although these 
were mostly constant, we estimated the breaks using yield spreads (subtracting the Swedish yields) and 
hence canceling out market-specific determinants. These estimations produced essentially the same results 
and are available from the authors upon request. 
5 Note that the fifth Nordic country, Iceland, is left out because of a lack of Icelandic government bond data. 
6The term “unknown” refers to the fact that no prior information about the existence or timing of the breaks 
is imposed before the estimations. By “letting the data speak” we therefore ensure that we do not merely 
capture our own preconceptions but rather the forward-looking views of the contemporaries. For a general 
overview of the large literature on structural break estimations, see Perron (2006). 
8 For example, Bryld (2001) describes the Danish historiography of World War II as a “history of legitimiza-
tion” (p. 14). He states further: “The official history of the occupation was made up in 1945, a story of po-
litical and pragmatic art which satisfied the needs for political unity and ethical consistency of the elites [...] 
and the majority of the population. [...] The main element of this story telling was patriotism.” (p. 29). In the 
case of Norway, Skodvin (1991, pp. 309f) describes that there were many postwar forces interested in influ-
encing the war history so that “their own people” came out as favorable as possible in the descriptions. 
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There is a growing literature that uses financial market data to analyze the effects of politi-
cal and institutional changes. In the groundbreaking analysis of Willard et al. (1996), 
events taking place during the U.S. civil war are analyzed based on their impact on the 
market for ”greenbacks”, a special currency issued by the Union. Following their ap-
proach, Frey and Kucher (2000, 2001) analyze how the events before and during World 
War II affected domestic and foreign government bond prices at the Zurich stock ex-
change. They find that these events consistently reflect many of the historically important 
events, such as the annexation of Austria by the Germans, the outbreak of the war, the 
German defeat at Stalingrad and the Yalta conference. Similar analyses of bond prices 
during World War II have been undertaken by Oosterlinck (2003) on France, Brown and 
Burdekin (2002) on German bonds traded in Britain, and by Frey and Waldenström (2004) 
on Belgian and German bonds traded simultaneously in Switzerland and Sweden. While 
all these studies are close in spirit to ours, none of them make the same explicit analysis of 
widely held pre-war threat assessments, nor do they compare those with the corresponding 
estimates of conventional historiography. Focusing on more contemporary war experi-
ences and the forward-looking elements of financial markets, Rigobon and Sack (2005) 
find a considerable war risk premium in the returns of several common financial assets 
during the build-up before the U.S. war in Iraq 2003. With a similar focus, Wolfers and 
Zitzewitz (2005) find that the war probabilities during the same pre-Iraq war period de-
rived from prices at so-called prediction markets, which are electronic venues trading se-
curities with payoffs contingent on specific political or economic outcomes, were highly 
consistent with the flow of war-related news and events.  
2 Nordic historiography on pre-World War II threats and its problems 
This section presents a selection of writings by well-known Nordic historians on how 
Nordic people perceived the pre-war threat during 1938–1940. Before this, however, we 
briefly point out some of the potentially severe methodological problems that these de-
scriptions are associated with.  
 
When historians describe public sentiments in history, they face some important methodo-
logical problems. First, public opinion almost always is tacit and hence not documented in 
written form, which makes it in principle unobservable to historians who primarily rely on 
written source materials. The second, and perhaps more important, problem is that histori-
ans may be highly influenced by their own postwar political and social context when se-
lecting and interpreting the historical facts at hand. This risk of having a sample selection 
bias is particularly prevalent for war or military historians, since wars are often politicized 
afterwards by postwar politicians and public opinions. Naturally, historians are well aware 
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of these problems (see, e.g., Carr, 1961 or Marwick, 1970) but all the same they seem to 
prevail in the context of the Scandinavian official World War II historiography.8 
 
Our outline of the “conventional” Nordic historical writing below consists of citations and 
references from texts by fifteen well-known and reputed Danish, Finnish, Norwegian and 
Swedish historians specializing in World War II.9 The choice to only read the works of 
Nordic historians exclusively came about because we believe them to be best suited to 
capture assessments of the public, but also because they correspond closest to the Nordic 
market actors whose assessments are estimated from market prices.10  
 
Denmark: Historians agree that the Danes felt quite safe from being involved in any of the 
war activities taking place on the European continent and that the German invasion of 
Denmark on April 9, 1940, came as a total surprise. However, the Danes were well aware 
of their geographical proximity to Germany and when they, as the only Scandinavian 
country, signed a non-aggression pact with Germany in mid-1939 this was regarded as 
“ensuring peace and stability” (Nissen, 1988, p. 353f). There is surprisingly little said 
about the reactions to the outbreak of war in Poland and Finland. There seems to have 
been some increased level of uncertainty after the Danish Prime Minister’s New Year’s 
speech in January 1940, in which he stated that Denmark would hardly be able to resist a 
foreign invasion, if it were to come about. People were infuriated by this defeatism, but 
according to Wendt (1966, pp. 41f) “All their worries disappeared entirely” when all par-
ties in Parliament immediately thereafter openly declared that Danish neutrality stood 
firm. One historian, Lidegaard (2005, p. 152), claims that Danish politicians were confi-
dent about their policy of passiveness and that it would minimize the risk of war: “the less 
Denmark did to attract [Hitler’s] attention the better”. Finally, when the German invasion 
came, Gram (1986, p. 15) asserts that it came as a surprise: “With the greater part of Nor-
wegian and Danish political and public concerns focused on the British laying of mines, 
the German strategic plan for a command of Norway – and the occupation of Denmark it 
would require – achieved in creating a complete surprise.” 
 
Finland: Most Finnish historians describe the Soviet Union as being perceived as a latent 
threat by the Finns in the 1930’s. There was even open mutual distrust between the two 
countries’ politicians (Zetterberg, 1991, p. 56). Yet Jakobson (1961, p. 99) writes that 
“there was no sense of immediate danger in Finland during the beautiful late summer of 
                                                 
9 It should be noted, however, that behind these fifteen researchers are a scanning of the works of at least 
twice as many Nordic historians but whose writings say nothing about the public sentiments at this time. 
One comprehensive listing of the Nordic World War II literature is Nøkleby (200X). 
10 Although the Finnish historian Max Jakobson, lacks a formal academic background, his works are widely 
cited and used by professional historians in all Nordic countries.  
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August and September 1939”. Interestingly, the views from the Swedish horizon were 
more pessimistic: “The German-Russo pact [publicly announced on August 23] placed 
Finland in an awkward position: Everybody could see that it offered Russia its best chance 
to re-conquer Finland since 1920” (Thulstrup, 1950, p. 8). Later on, however, also the 
Finns perceived an increased Soviet threat. Jakobson (1961, p. 139) writes that although 
Foreign Minister Paasikivi in mid-November believed that Stalin would leave Finland in 
peace, “The majority, however, held a different view of Stalin’s intensions”. Finally, it is 
not clear if the Finns really anticipated the Soviet attack which eventually came on No-
vember 30 or if the did not. On the one hand, Finland was fully mobilized already in early 
October but, on the other hand, the government started to send troops home from the front 
from mid-November onwards. Perhaps this is explained by the evidence found after the 
war which says that in late November “most diplomatic observers” in Finland and in Mos-
cow thought that “the Soviet Union would not try to enforce its claims on Finland or Ro-
mania by force of arms” (Jakobson, 1961, p. 142).  
 
Norway: Historians agree that of all Northerners the Norwegians felt the most safe from 
becoming involved in a war on the European continent. The German invasion in April 
1940, therefore, is described as a complete surprise. As in the Danish case, very little is 
said about the public’s reaction to the wars on the continent and in Finland. Not even the 
Altmark incident on February 16, 1940 is described as having affected the Norwegians. 
During this incident, British troops boarded a German destroyer in Norwegian waters. 
This launched a fierce German protests against Norway which resulted in a sharp Norwe-
gian protest against Britain (Skodvin, 1991, pp. 38f). The German invasion, finally, came 
as a surprise. Bull (1979, pp. 342f) states that its “surprise tactics was a success” and that 
many citizens of Oslo, “woken up in the night by the sirens warning for an airborne attack 
were annoyed since they believed it to be just another practice exercise”. Furthermore, 
Jensen (1965, p. 113) writes: “On the basis of what everyone knew [at the time], the situa-
tion was so serious that it now seems unimaginable that we did not react any differently 
than we did. It only shows how deeply rooted the belief had generally become among the 
Norwegians, that we could manage to keep out of the conflict. The parliament and gov-
ernment were representatives of a view that was general.”  
 
Sweden: As for the Swedes, most, but not all, historians describe that they felt quite sure of 
remaining outside the war. Åberg (1992, p. 522) states that “In the beginning of the war, 
none of the governments in Sweden, Norway and Denmark seems to have worried about a 
German attack on Scandinavia”. Carlgren (1989, p. 150) asserts that “there is a striking 
contrast between the confidence shown [after the outbreak of World War II] and the wide-
spread popular worries that followed the outbreak of World War I”. One Swedish histo-
 7
rian, Johansson (1982, p. 138), offers a somewhat different picture, arguing that the Fin-
nish war made the Swedes more aware of the external military threats: “When the world 
war broke out the Nordic countries did not seem threatened. Many people regarded the 
Pact in Moscow as assuring peace to the Baltic region. [...] The war between Finland and 
the Soviet Union, however, was a severe blow that stunned Sweden.” He continues: 
“There was a general agreement among the overwhelming majority of the population that 
Sweden must use each day still in peace to arm its military defense. The dominating sen-
timent was that Sweden was given a respite under the gallows which had to be exploited” 
(Johansson, 1982, p. 139). Sweden nevertheless demobilized its already limited number of 
military forces on a broad frontier after Germany’s invasion of Denmark and Norway, 
which according to Norborg (1981, pp. 249ff) signifies a firm belief that Sweden would 
not be drawn into the war activities.11 On balance, it is fair to say that historians would de-
scribe the Swedish threat assessments as practically nonexistent during most of this period, 
perhaps with exception for the time of the Finnish-Soviet war (November 30, 1939 – 
March 12, 1940). 
3 Data series and institutional setting 
The main data used are secondary yields to maturity of Nordic government bonds, calcu-
lated from bid prices quoted on the markets in Copenhagen, Helsinki, Oslo and Stockholm 
between January 1938 and December 1940. Table 1 lists detailed information on the indi-
vidual bond loans analyzed and their sources. As can be noted from the table, there are 
domestic bond yields from all markets but foreign yields for the non-Swedish bonds avail-
able from the Stockholm market, where both domestic and foreign securities were listed 
and traded. There are some variations in the data coverage in the different markets, which 
are due to both insufficient reporting and institutional specificities. For example, the Hel-
sinki Stock Exchange stopped all bond trading from October 11, 1939 to the end of the 
war and we could not find prices prior to August 1939 for Oslo. 
 
The institutions governing the trading and pricing at these bond markets were, for most of 
the period studied, fairly well functioning. There are some indications of non-market in-
fluences such as central bankled interventions and various forms of circuit breakers (e.g., 
trading halts and price controls). Although lending governments always wish to keep 
down the interest rates on their own debt instruments, the available evidence from the 
                                                 
11 Two much more imminent threats of war to Sweden, according to Norborg (1981, p. 255) and Johansson 
(2002), were the “Midsummer Crisis” in June 1941, when the Swedish government considered refusing the 
Germans to ship troops across Swedish territory, and the “February Crisis” in February 1942 when the 
Swedes sent large numbers of troops to the Norwegian border in order to meet an expected German invasion 
based on cracked German secret messages. 
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Danish and Stockholm market suggests that these initiatives were both relatively few and 
probably had a limited long-run effect. Concerning our analysis of sovereign yield 
changes, moreover, we focus on very large and statistically significant lasting shifts that 
would be very expensive for one single actor to prevent from occurring. Among the circuit 
breakers recorded, there were price controls in Copenhagen (strict price controls were in-
troduced in September 1939 and maintained during the entire war) and Stockholm (mild 
price controls were only used from September-December 1939) and a bond market closure 
in Helsinki from October 11, 1939 onwards. But in the cases of Copenhagen and Stock-
holm, the impact on quoted asset prices, in particular over the longer run, was quite lim-
ited (Waldenström, 2005). The cross-border capital flows halted from September 1939 
onwards, which implies that there were no extensive buybacks by the lending governments 
after that point in time. We do not know the identity of the market actors, which would be 
of particular interest to a study like ours.12 However, we know that thousands of Nordic 
households were holding government bonds (about 6% of the entire stock in Sweden in 
1940) but that the most important investors, and most likely also traders on the financial 
markets, were large Nordic financial institutions.   
 
There are also some problems with the data. Some values are missing in the Finnish and 
Norwegian bond yields recorded at the Stockholm market.13 Missing values could be a 
sign of insufficient reporting or publishing of prices, but it could also signal more severe 
problems such as low trading volumes. We consequently use bid prices instead of sell 
prices, which caps the risk of having rigged prices. Moreover, based on a sample of daily 
volumes of the individual foreign loans traded at the Stockholm Stock Exchange and an 
estimate of the aggregate OTC bond trading, there seem to have been active and 
continuous trading on the Stockholm foreign bond market during the whole study period.14 
Since the econometric method requires the series to be continuous they are linearly inter-
polated over the gaps. This has little effect on the data except in for Norwegian yields in 
Stockholm right after the German invasion in April 1940 (during April-September that 
year we only have bid price observations in six of 25 weeks).  
                                                 
12 If all traders acted rationally, however, their identity actually does not matter since they all capitalize on 
the same publicly available information. 
13 Specifically, there are missing values in the Finnish yields in December 1939 and April-May 1940 and in 
the Norwegian yields in April-June 1940. 
14 We collected a small sample of trading volumes from the Stockholm Stock Exchange for all days during 
March, June, September and December in 1938 and 1940 for the four Nordic government bonds. The result 
shows that trading was relatively large in all bonds at all times except the Norwegian bonds after April 1940. 
Moreover, Waldenström (2006) estimates the size of the interwar and wartime Stockholm OTC market, i.e,. 
the traditionally most important secondary bond market, finding similar evidence of sufficient trading vol-
umes for most periods and countries’ bond loans. 
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4 Empirical methodology 
In order to link shifts in quoted sovereign yields with changes in people’s threat percep-
tions, we employ a recent econometric methodology developed by Bai and Perron (1998, 
2003) to estimate unknown multiple structural breaks in univariate time series. There are 
many advantages to using this particular method. For example, it does not rest on any prior 
information about the existence and timing of the structural changes. Instead it simply 
“lets the data speak”, which has been shown to be a crucial consistency feature (see Perron 
2006). Moreover, the method is among the few able to consistently estimate a large, un-
specified number of breaks, and also to calculate their size and confidence intervals while 
allowing for a considerable variation in distributions of the error terms, both within and 
across segments.  
 
We estimate the breaks by fitting the following system of linear regressions: 
 
yt = cj + εt,  t = Tj–1+1, ... , Tj. (1) 
 
where subscript j (j = 1,…, m+1) denotes the time series segments that are separated by the 
m structural breaks, yt the nominal sovereign yield of each country at time t expressed in 
basis points, cj is the estimated intercept (average yield) for each segment and εt a white 
noise error term.15 The method tests for the existence of breaks using two types of Wald 
tests. If they indicate that breaks exist, the method estimates their exact number using a 
sequential strategy which halts when no more significant breaks are found.16 An important 
parameter to set before the undertaken estimations is the smallest allowed length of the 
segments in order for breaks to be called “structural”. We follow the standard procedures 
and require breaks to be at least ten percent of the total sequence length, which means that 
our segments will be at least 20 days or weeks depending on which yield series is used.17  
 
Our motivation for using a relatively simplistic model as in equation (1) is that this mean 
model produces intuitive and easily interpreted estimates of the structural breaks; the 
break size, ĉj – ĉj–1, is the number of basis points with which the yields increase or de-
crease. One issue that arises is that most high-frequency financial variables, including the 
bond yields used here, exhibit high degrees of persistency which are not fully accounted 
                                                 
15 We follow the convention of using T0 = 1 and Tm+1 = T (total length of sequence).  
16 For details of the method’s inferential setup, we refer the reader to the papers by Bai and Perron (1998, 
2003). All estimations use the GAUSS program available from Pierre Perron’s web page. 
17 This corresponds to the series lengths listed in Table 1. Technically, we choose trimming parameter π to 
be 0.10 (10 percent). Bai and Perron (2005) recommend having at least 18 observations in each segment for 
the calculation of variance-covariance matrices. For robustness purposes, we also used both shorter (0.05) 
and longer (0.15) trimming parameters but found no important differences in the basic findings. 
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for. The robustness of the Bai and Perron methodology with its apparatus for dealing with 
a wide range of error distributions, however, alleviates most such modeling concerns. 
Moreover, simulations by Paye and Timmerman (2003) suggest that persistency has lim-
ited effect on the ability of Bai and Perron’s method to consistently pick the correct break 
points. Nevertheless, to make sure our model choice does not interfere with the results we 
have run parallel break searches using a yield model with a lagged dependent variable, yt = 
cj + βyt–1 + εt. The results are basically the same as in the mean model except that the auto-
regression term dampens the estimated break size and dates the breaks one or two months 
earlier.18 The remarkable consistency in the dating of breaks across the models comes 
from the large magnitudes of most breaks corresponding to the extreme political wartime 
shocks. In fact, Bai and Perron (2003) emphasize that large break magnitudes is a crucial 
prerequisite for having robust break estimates.  
 
Another modeling issue of importance is that nominal sovereign yields also pick up influ-
ences from other factors than the default risk, especially from macroeconomic fluctuations 
such as inflation or market interest rates. To check that this does not interfere with our re-
sults, we replace the yields in equation (1) with yield spreads for that part of our dataset 
(the Stockholm data) that includes sovereign yields from all Nordic countries. The yield 
spreads for the three non-Swedish countries, defined as their yields less the Swedish yield, 
should cancel out most common macroeconomic influences. The results are basically 
identical with the main results of the paper, which again indicates a satisfactory robustness 
of our method and findings. 
 
Finally, how should one interpret the structural break sizes in terms of the magnitude of a 
changed war threat? This question concerns the expected impact of a war on a country’s 
sovereign yields, and there are no clear-cut answers in either asset pricing theory or finan-
cial history on this issue. In principle, all borrowing countries balance the costs of a de-
fault (reputational losses that most likely result in more expensive future borrowing) with 
its benefits (retained cash that is not paid out to lenders), and war may in various ways 
change both the costs and benefits in complex ways depending on several factors such as 
the fiscal status of the country, the extent and length of the war, or the design of the exist-
ing debt contracts (e.g., gold clauses). Looking at history, there are several examples dur-
ing the 19th and 20th centuries of belligerent countries that in some way defaulted on their 
debt, although the opposite, i.e., countries at war sustaining the servicing of its debt, was 
more common.19 Hence, interwar sovereign debt markets cannot have been excessively 
worried of debt defaults even if a war were to break out. In terms of our study, we should 
                                                 
18 These estimates are available upon request. 
19 See Suter (1992, pp. 61–83).  
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hence expect increased threats of war to be associated with higher, but not infinite, yields. 
Additional evidence on the robustness of interwar bond investors is the remarkable cases 
of government bonds issued by countries that formally had ceased to exist, e.g., Tsarist 
Russia after 1917 or Austria after 1938, that kept on being traded and quoted at almost 
normal yield levels for years.20 
5 Results and comparative analysis 
5.1 Structural breaks in the Nordic sovereign yields 
Table 2 shows the estimated structural breaks in the Nordic sovereign yields during 1938–
1940.21 Consider first the Danish government bonds at home and in other northern coun-
tries. The Danish yields in Copenhagen (Figures 1 and 2) exhibit several major positive 
breaks at the time of some major war events, which signals clearly increasing threat per-
ceptions well before the German invasion in April 1940. The first two breaks, amounted to 
combined 120 basic bond yield points, occurred around the time of the outbreak of World 
War II and the third occurred in mid February 1940 during the Altmark incident off the 
Norwegian coast (discussed above). Looking at the Danish yields in Stockholm (Figure 3), 
we see similar, but even stronger indications of increased war threats in 1939. There is a 
very small, and seemingly politically insignificant break in late 1938, but then there is a 
notable break in late March 1939, shortly after the German annexation of Czechoslovakia. 
A third break occurred in late August 1939, simultaneously with the first Copenhagen 
break. The fourth break is recorded in early December 1939, which was just after the So-
viet attack on Finland which increased the Danish yields by 215 basis points. Finally, the 
German invasion of Denmark on April 9, 1940, which had been recorded in Stockholm 
since Sweden was still neutral and at peace, produced a significant break of +361 basis 
points, but the initial spike during the first week after the invasion amounted to +1,900 ba-
sis points! Hence, these results show that the traders in Denmark and Sweden perceived a 
clearly increased war threat on Denmark well ahead of the German invasion. The invasion 
spike in the Stockholm yields, reflecting the yield under realization of war, however, sug-
gests that the Swedish investors still believed that a continued peace was more likely than 
the outbreak of war in Denmark.22  
 
                                                 
20 Oosterlinck and Landon-Lane (2006) show that Tsarist Russian bonds kept being traded in Paris in 1918–
1919 on yields averaging at no more than 8 percent! Similarly, Austrian bonds traded in Zurich throughout 
World War II at about a 15 percent yield (Frey and Kucher, 2000). 
21 There are additional results from the estimations that do not appear in the table, including the SupFT(ℓ|0)- 
and max1≥ℓ≥LSupFT(ℓ|0)-tests for existence as well as the sequential SupFT(ℓ+1|ℓ)-test for the number of 
breaks. These are available upon request.  
22 An “assessed war probability”, calculated as the Stockholm yields right before the war divided by the tip 
of the yield spike right after the war outbreak, for Denmark is 40% (750 bp / 1,150 bp = 0.395). 
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Consider now the Finnish government bonds at home and abroad. The Finnish yields in 
Helsinki (Figure 4) exhibit two very small, and unimportant, breaks recorded during Feb-
ruary-March 1939. By contrast, a third break on September 6, of +62 basis points suggests 
that the outbreak of war on the continent was clearly perceived as affecting Finland in a 
negative way. Since the Helsinki Stock Exchange closed down all bond trading on Octo-
ber 11, we cannot tell from the yields how the Finns reacted to the continued development 
although the closure of the stock exchange by itself indicates increasing fears of a substan-
tially increased political turbulence. The Finnish yields in Stockholm (Figure 5) contain 
three structural breaks, the first one in early September 1939, i.e., at the same time as in 
Helsinki but much larger, of +862 basis points. The second break was in early December, 
i.e., after the Soviet attack on Finland, which increased the yields by an additional 2,083 
basis points! The third break occurred in mid-March 1940, immediately after the Soviet-
Finnish truce, and interestingly it was by –1,298 basis points. In other words, while both 
Finns and Swedes interpreted the German-Russo anti-aggression pact and the outbreak of 
war in Poland as strongly increased external threats to Finland, the actual outbreak of war 
in Finland further increased the sovereign risk (in Sweden). 
 
Consider, thirdly, the Norwegian government bonds. The Norwegian yields in Oslo (Fig-
ure 6) experienced five structural breaks. Of these, the first four in early September, mid-
October, early December 1939, and one in late January 1940 were significant increases of 
132 basis points in total. While the September and December breaks are clearly associated 
with war events in Poland and Finland, the other two are less obviously related with the 
war developments. The last break occurred in mid-March 1940, directly in relation to the 
announced truce in Finland and, interestingly, it was a yield cut by 55 basis points indicat-
ing a lowered perceived threat after this peace event. As for the Norwegian yields in 
Stockholm (Figure 7), they portray a much more homogenous picture. The first break in 
early September 1939 was a 201 basis points increase and the second +176 basis point 
break in late December clearly indicate increased war threats to Norway, as perceived by 
traders in Sweden. Then there was a third break recorded just after the German invasion, 
in April 1940, measuring +333 basis points and hence indicating that the eventuality of 
war was not entirely capitalized by the Swedish market actors. Later in 1940 there is a 
fourth break of –243 basis points, which most likely signals the resolved uncertainty about 
the effects of the German occupation on Norway’s economy and, perhaps, even status as a 
sovereign nation. 
 
Finally, consider the Swedish government bonds. The Swedish yields recorded in Stock-
holm (Figure 8) experienced five structural breaks between 1938 and 1940. Three of these 
were significant yield increases occurring right at the time of several major war events: the 
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outbreak of the war in early September 1939 (+66 basis points), the Finnish-Soviet war in 
December 1939 (+44 basis points) and the German invasion of Denmark and Norway in 
early April 1940 (+15 basis points). An interesting observation is that the yield increases 
get smaller the closer the war gets to Scandinavia. This could signal that Swedes regarded 
the risk of an attack on Sweden as being independent of the risk of attacks on the other 
Nordic countries. Given the vast importance of the Swedish iron ore exports to, in particu-
lar, the German war industry such a conjecture may actually have been plausible at the 
time. 
  
A general finding of these estimations is the interesting distribution of responses to the 
events across geographical borders. While foreign and domestic traders react almost iden-
tically in time to the same major political events, the magnitude of their reactions in terms 
of basis point changes differ by a factor of between five and fifteen. The Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact, for example, boosted the Danish government yields by 51 basis points in 
Copenhagen but by 136 basis points in Stockholm. Similarly, the Soviet invasion of 
Finland raised Norwegian sovereign yields by 48 basis points in Oslo but 176 basis points 
in Stockholm. The reasons for this heterogeneity has been studied by Waldenström (2006), 
who looks at the specific case of the Danish sovereign debt traded in Copenhagen and 
Stockholm in the late 1930s and the entire 1940s. The single most important explanation 
for this discrepancy is that governments tend to discriminate against foreign investors vis-
à-vis their domestic counterparts and that this is mainly driven by political power con-
cerns.23 
5.2 Comparing the views of historians and markets 
This section compares the estimates of historians and markets about the widely perceived 
war threats in the Nordic countries in 1938–1940. Since neither approach is free from 
methodological and data-related problems this exercise is not about any version being 
“right” or “wrong” or “better” or “worse”. Rather, we wish to shed light on whether they 
differ at all and, if so, why and in what way. Table 3 uses the findings from previous sec-
tions to classify the level of assessed threats for each Nordic country in different time pe-
riods. A first result is that there is agreement on that Nordic people perceived little exter-
nal threat before late August 1939. Although the Danish yields rose in March of that year, 
the substantial yield increases came right after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact or the Ger-
man attack on Poland one week later. This also suggests that the Nordic people did not 
compare themselves to Austria and Czechoslovakia in terms of foreign policy relations 
                                                 
23 Competing hypotheses rejected by Waldenström (2006) are local government (or central bank) interfer-
ence in bond market to keep yields low, institutional differences in market regulations and microstructure, 
and different degrees of risk aversion across the national markets. 
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with “big neighbor” Germany, at least judging from the lack of major threat increases re-
corded after their annexations in 1938 and 1939, respectively. 
 
The most significant result from the comparison is the discrepancy in perceived threats 
between the two versions. In short, the financial markets signal substantially higher war 
risk expectations than historians do. For example, whereas historians report that the Danes 
and Norwegians felt largely secure up to the German invasion, the markets display several 
dramatic yield increases following some of the most important war-related events: the 
German-Russo Pact, the outbreak of World War II, the war between Finland and the So-
viet Union as well as some minor events in early 1940. In the case of the Finns, both the 
Finnish and Swedish financial markets reflect significant war threats after the German-
Russo Pact and the outbreak of war, whereas historians suggest there were none. Interest-
ingly, not even the Finnish political and military leaders, who were arguably better 
informed than the Finnish people, perceived a larger war threat more in line with the bond 
markets before the Soviet attack. In fact, our historical outline in section 2 showed that 
while the Finnish people in October 1939 started feeling seriously uneasy with the Soviet 
intentions after having observed the Soviet annexations of the Baltic states, the Finnish 
government continued to put their trust into the benevolence of Stalin and even withdrew 
troops from the front in late November.  
 
There are, however, several points of agreement between the historians and the markets. 
One such instance is the fact that the Norwegian yields in Oslo actually decreased after the 
announcement of the Moscow truce in March 1940, which hence was interpreted as lower-
ing the risk of war on Norwegian soil. It should be noted, however, that the Swedes did 
not seem to have reached the same conclusions as the Norwegian yields in Stockholm 
stayed at their relatively high pre-invasion level through March. Another example of 
concurrence is the fact that the realization of war in Finland, Denmark and Norway gave 
rise to yield spikes in the respective countries’ bonds traded in Stockholm. If anything, this 
indicates that there was no one who fully anticipated the wars, which hence supports the 
claims of historians. Judging from the magnitudes of the estimated breaks relative the 
short-term spikes, which reflect the prospected yield under the realization of war, the mar-
ket actors viewed the probability of war in Denmark, Finland and Norway as being some-
where around 50 percent.24 
                                                 
24 The “assessed war probabilities”, calculated as the pre-war yields divided by the tip of the yield spike right 
after the war outbreak, are for Denmark 40% (recall the previous section), for Finland 35% (1,100 bp / 3,200 
bp = 0.344) and for Norway 54% (700 bp / 1,300 bp = 0.538). 
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6 Concluding remarks 
Nordic historians have asserted for a long time that in the Nordic countries only few peo-
ple, if any, experienced increased war threats against their own countries in the late 1930s 
and early 1940, i.e., just before three of them were in fact attacked by enemy powers. This 
historical result, in turn, has played an important part in explaining, and also excusing, 
why the Nordic governments refrained from mobilizing their armies until it was too late. 
This paper contrasts this established notion by using a different method to analyze the 
widely held war threat assessments. Our method focuses on changes in Nordic government 
bond yields during 1938–1940 and the fact that changes in these yields that coincide with 
important war events reflect changes in war risks assessed in real time by the contempo-
raries. 
 
Our main finding is that there are several large points of disagreement between the two 
interpretations of history. While historians in general state that the Nordic peoples felt safe 
from being attacked until the autumn of 1939 (Finland), the winter of 1939 (Sweden) or 
early April, 1940 (Denmark and Norway), the government bond prices of these countries 
fell considerably, or sovereign yields increased significantly, several months before these 
conjectured dates. The yield changes were mostly direct responses to major war-related 
political events such as the announcement of the Molotov-Ribbentrop in late August 1939 
or the Soviet attack on Finland in late November of the same year which boosted the sov-
ereign yields of all Nordic countries.  
 
There are, however, also some points of agreement between the two interpretations of his-
tory. For example, Norwegian yields traded in Oslo, decreased significantly after the Mos-
cow truce between Finland and the Soviet Union. Moreover, all Nordic yields traded in 
Stockholm spiked after the outbreak of war (Finland in December 1939, Denmark and 
Norway in April 1940). Both these cases suggest that market traders did not fully believe 
in a war coming, which offers some support to the general assessment of historians.  
 
What then could explain the observed discrepancies between the historical writing and the 
market-based assessments? We have already pointed at well-known methodological prob-
lems with the historical analysis that could be one part of the explanation. These problems 
concern the focus on text-based sources in the historical research. Another important 
source of bias may be that historians may partly respond to pressures from their own po-
litical and social contexts, which is reflected in their war historiographies. Naturally, part 
of the discrepancy may also be due to skewed selection of the available historical writing. 
There is an enormous literature on World War II and to adequately reconcile a balanced 
account of it is difficult. We are also well aware that the financial market-based analysis is 
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not without its own problems, as has been discussed above. For example, the data quality 
is questionable in some instances and the econometric method used rests on specific mod-
eling choices.  
 
Altogether, the work of historians is without any doubt crucial and indispensable to under-
stand the views and threat perceptions of the prime actors in history. We argue that 
econometrically analyzing reactions on financial markets presents a useful complement to 
traditional historiography. This paper uses historical government bond yields to derive the 
perceived threats of war. This analysis suggests robust changes in risk assessments corre-
lated in time with the most important geopolitical events leading up to the war, thereby 
questioning some, but not all, of the conventional Nordic World War II historiography. 
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Table 1: Nordic government bond loans analyzed in the study. 
Bond loan, period, coupon Freq. T Ave. CV Trading period Source 
Stockholm market:       
Danish gov., 1936–56, 4%  Weekly 157 0.055 0.621 1/4/38–12/31/40 Affärsvärlden 
Finnish gov., 1934–44, 5%  Weekly 157 0.116 0.883 1/4/38–12/31/40 Affärsvärlden 
Norwegian gov., 1934–59, 4%  Weekly 157 0.058 0.591 1/4/38–12/31/40 Affärsvärlden 
Swedish gov., consol, 3%  Weekly 157 0.033 0.150 1/4/38–12/31/40 Affärsvärlden 
Copenhagen market:       
Danish gov., 1934–59, 4%  Weekly 78 0.0546 0.112 10/1/38–4/5/40 Finanstidende 
Danish gov., 1934–59, 4%  Daily 189 0.0493 0.139 7/3/39–4/8/40 Berglinske 
Tidende 
Oslo market:       
Norwegian gov., 1937–68, 4.5% Daily 212 0.051 0.084 8/2/39–4/8/40 Morgenbladet, 
Aftenposten 
Helsinki market:       
Finnish gov., 1935–60, 5%  Daily 238 0.051 0.043 1/3/39–10/10/39 Hufvudstads-
bladet 
Note: “Freq.” denotes trading frequency, “T” is the number of observations, “Ave.” is the average mean 
level of the series used and “CV” is the coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by the average). 
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Table 2: Structural breaks in Nordic sovereign yields, 1938–1940. 
Country, 
Break No. Break date 
Confidence 
interval 
(periods) 
Break size 
(basis points) Contemporaneous war event 
Denmark Copenhagen market, Daily series, 7/3/1939–4/8/1940 (T = 189) 
1 8/25/1939 [–2, +1] +51 German-Soviet anti-aggression pact 
2 9/26/1939 [–4, +1] +71 Outbreak of World War II 
3 2/14/1940 [–1, +6] +54 Altmark incident in Norway (?) 
 Copenhagen market, Weekly series, 10/1/1938–4/5/1940 (T = 78) 
1 9/22/1939 [–1, +1] +120 Outbreak of World War II 
2 2/16/1940 [–1, +2] +54 Altmark incident in Norway (?) 
 Stockholm market, Weekly series, 1/4/1938–12/31/1940 (T = 157) 
1 12/13/1938 [–6, +6] +13  
2 3/28/1939 [–19, +1] +40 Germany annexes Czechoslovakia 
3 8/22/1939 [–6, +2] +136 German-Soviet anti-aggression pact 
4 12/5/1939 [-2, +3] +215 Soviet Union attacks Finland 
5 4/9/1940 [–38, +1] +361 Germany invades Denmark 
Finland Helsinki market, Daily series, 1/3/1939–10/10/1939 (T = 238) 
1 2/2/1939 [–4, +1] –5  
2 3/30/1939 [–27, +1] +6  
3 9/6/1939 [–1, +1] +62 Outbreak of World War II 
 Stockholm market, Weekly series, 1/4/1938–12/31/1940 (T = 157) 
1 9/5/1939 [–6, +6] +864 Outbreak of World War II 
2 12/9/1939 [–19, +1] +2,083 Soviet Union attacks Finland 
3 4/2/1940 [–6, +2] –1,298 Finnish-Soviet peace treaty 
Norway Oslo market, Daily series, 8/2/1939–4/8/1940 (T = 212) 
1 9/8/1939 [–3, 0] +38 Outbreak of World War II 
2 10/16/1939 [–2, +13] +17  
3 12/11/1939 [–1, +1] +48 Soviet Union attacks Finland 
4 1/29/1939 [–1, +3] +29  
5 3/13/1939 [–1, +1] –55 Outbreak of World War II 
 Stockholm market, Weekly series, 1/4/1938–12/31/1940 (T = 157) 
1 9/5/1939 [–1, +2] +201 Outbreak of World War II 
2 12/26/1939 [–1, +1] +176 Soviet Union attacks Finland 
3 4/30/1940 [–1, +1] +333 Germany invades Norway 
4 9/10/1940 [–1, +2] –243 Norwegian resistance ends (Aug.) 
Sweden Stockholm market, Weekly series, 1/4/1938–12/31/1940 (T = 157) 
1 4/18/1939 [–26, +1] +8  
2 9/12/1939 [–2, +1] +60 Outbreak of World War II 
3 12/26/1939 [–1, +3] +44 Soviet Union attacks Finland 
4 4/9/1940 [–15, +3] +15 Germany attacks Denmark/Norway 
5 7/30/1940 [–1, +2] –49  
Note: The table shows the number of breaks selected by the procedure of Bai and Perron (1998, 2003), their 
95% confidence interval in brackets showing the number of periods (days or weeks) surrounding the break 
date, the size of the break in numbers of basis points (the difference between average yields in the segments 
before and after the break), and a political or military event coinciding with the break. 
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Table 3: Nordic government bond loans analyzed in the study. 
Public pre-war threat assessments 
according to... 
 
Country Time period 
Historians Bond markets Agree? 
 – Mar. 1939 None None Yes 
Apr. 1939 – Aug. 25, 1939 None Some No Denmark 
Aug. 25, 1939 – Apr. 1940 None Some/Large No 
 – Aug. 23, 1939 None None Yes 
Aug. 23, 1939 – Sep. 1939 None Some/Large No Finland 
Oct. 1939 – Nov. 1939 Some Large No 
 – Aug. 1939 None None Yes 
Sep. 1939 – Mar. 13, 1940 None Some/Large No Norway 
Mar. 13, 1940 – Apr. 9, 1940 None Some No 
1938 – Aug. 30, 1939 None None Yes 
Sep. 1, 1939 – Nov. 30, 1939 None Some No Sweden 
Dec. 1, 1939 –  Some Some Yes 
Note: When the market-based assessment says “Some/Large” this refers to the fact that the domestic yields 
reflected smaller threat increases than the foreign yields did in response to the same political events. 
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Figure 1: Danish sovereign yields and structural breaks. Copenhagen market (daily data). 
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Note: The figure is based on results in Table 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Danish sovereign yields and structural breaks. Copenhagen market (weekly data). 
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Note: The figure is based on results in Table 2. 
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Figure 3: Danish sovereign yields and structural breaks. Stockholm market (weekly data). 
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Note: The figure is based on results in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Finnish sovereign yields and structural breaks. Helsinki market (daily data). 
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Note: The figure is based on results in Table 2. 
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Figure 5: Finnish sovereign yields and structural breaks. Stockholm market (weekly data). 
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Note: The figure is based on results in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Norwegian sovereign yields and structural breaks. Oslo market (daily data). 
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Note: The figure is based on results in Table 2. 
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Figure 7: Norwegian sovereign yields and structural breaks. Stockholm market (weekly 
data). 
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Note: The figure is based on results in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Swedish sovereign yields and structural breaks. Stockholm market (weekly data). 
240
280
320
360
400
440
480
1938:01 1938:06 1938:11 1939:04 1939:09 1940:02 1940:07 1940:12
Bo
n
d
 y
ie
ld
 (
in
 b
as
is
 p
o
in
ts
)
Swedish sovereign yields in Stockholm Fitted structural breaks
WWII outbreak
(Sep. 1, 1939)
German invasion of Denmark 
and Norway (Apr. 9, 1940)
Soviet attack on Finland
(Nov. 30, 1939)
 
Note: The figure is based on results in Table 2. 
 
